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THE DEATH KNELL FOR THE DEATH 
PENALTY: JUDGE CARNEY’S ORDER TO 
KILL CAPITAL PUNISHMENT RINGS LOUD 
ENOUGH TO REACH THE SUPREME COURT 
Alyssa Hughes∗ 
I. INTRODUCTION
District Judge Cormac J. Carney’s Order in Jones v. Chappell,1 
declaring California’s death penalty system unconstitutional and 
vacating the petitioner’s death sentence, may ring loud enough for 
the Supreme Court to hear.2 Judge Carney based his decision on the 
premise that the systemic delay and arbitrary administration of 
executions creates a dysfunctional system that strips the “ultimate 
sanction”3 of the purposes of punishment.4 Without the life-saving 
deterrent and retributive justifications, Carney wrote, the penalty is 
reduced to the cruel and unusual punishment forbidden by the United 
States Constitution.5 
∗ J.D. Candidate, May 2016, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles; B.S. Civil and
Environmental Engineering, Georgia Institute of Technology, May 2004. The author wishes to 
thank Professor Laurie L. Levenson for her endless energy and perpetual passion. 
1. 31 F. Supp. 3d 1050 (C.D. Cal. 2014).
2. See Brent E. Newton, Justice Kennedy, the Purposes of Capital Punishment, and the
Future of Lackey Claims, 62 BUFF. L. REV. 979, 999 (2014) (commenting that Jones v. Chappell 
“may well be the vehicle for the Supreme Court to finally address the Lackey issue”). 
3. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 286 (1972).
4. Jones, 31 F. Supp. 3d at 1050–51. Since 1978, 13 out of 900 inmates sentenced to death
have been executed. Further, costs associated with the death penalty system are estimated at over 
$4 billion since 1978. Arthur L. Alarcon & Paula M. Mitchell, Executing the Will of the Voters?: 
A Roadmap to Mend or End the California Legislature’s Multi-Billion-Dollar Death Penalty 
Debacle, 44 LOY. L.A. L. REV. S41, S65 (2011). 
5. The Eighth Amendment proscribes: “Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive
fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.” U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. The 
provision is incorporated through the Fourteenth Amendment and made applicable to the states. 
Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 675 (1962). “The death penalty can be justified, when it 
can be justified, only to the extent that it is necessary to serve vital and legitimate penological 
goals.” Ceja v. Stewart, 134 F.3d 1368, 1375 (9th Cir. 1998) (Fletcher, J., dissenting). 
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Attorney General Kamala Harris appealed the decision, stating 
that it is “not supported by the law.”6 The Eighth Amendment claim 
the Attorney General disputes encompasses two issues related to the 
administration of capital punishment: “inordinate delay” and 
“arbitrary execution.”7 Mr. Jones is not the first to raise the claim, 
Judge Carney is not the first to recognize it, and this particular state 
entity is not the first to refute it. 
The inordinate delay aspect of the challenge made its way to the 
doors of the Supreme Court twenty years ago in Lackey v. Texas.8 
Justice Stevens, dissenting from the denial of certiorari, 
acknowledged the “importance and novelty” and potential viability9 
of the petitioner’s claim that inflicting death after seventeen years on 
death row violated the Eighth Amendment because “the acceptable 
state interest in retribution has arguably been satisfied by the severe 
punishment already inflicted.”10 This claim came to be known as a 
“Lackey claim.”11 No lower court has ever granted relief on a Lackey 
claim,12 and the Supreme Court has repeatedly denied certiorari on 
the issue.13 
6. See Maura Dolan, California AG Kamala Harris to Appeal Ruling Against Death
Penalty, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 21, 2014, 2:41 PM), http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-ln-
death-penalty-appeal-20140821-story.html. 
7. See id.
8. (Lackey II), 514 U.S. 1045 (1995). Lackey was arrested and charged with capital murder
in mid-1977. Due to two mandatory appeals, his conviction was not finalized until fifteen years 
later. At that time, Lackey began state and federal habeas corpus proceedings. The state courts 
issued four death warrants for him, and in 1995 the Supreme Court twice stayed his execution. 
See Lackey v. Scott (Lackey III), 514 U.S. 1093, 1093 (1995) (granting second stay application); 
Lackey v. Texas (Lackey I), 514 U.S. 1001, 1001 (1995) (granting first stay application). He was 
executed in 1997 after the Supreme Court denied his third stay. See In re Lackey, 520 U.S. 1227, 
1227 (1997) (denying third stay application and denying certiorari). 
9. Lackey II, 514 U.S. at 1045 (“Though novel, petitioner’s claim is not without
foundation.”). 
10. Id.
11. See LaGrand v. Stewart, 170 F.3d 1158, 1160 (9th Cir. 1999) (“Claims that the Eighth
Amendment would be violated by the execution of an inmate after many years [on death row] are 
called Lackey claims . . . .”). See generally Newton, supra note 2, at 986–87 (discussing the 
development of Lackey claims and considering several Supreme Court decisions on the issue). 
12. See, e.g., People v. Frye, 959 P.2d 183 (Cal. 1998); People v. Ochoa, 28 P.3d 78 (Cal.
2001); People v. Brown, 93 P.3d 244 (Cal. 2004). 
13. See Newton, supra note 2, at 987. A few years after Lackey, the Ninth Circuit denied a
stay of execution on the inordinate delay issue in Ceja v. Stewart, 134 F.3d 1368 (9th Cir. 1998). 
At the time, Judge Fletcher dissented from the denial and urged the court to address the merits of 
the claim on the basis that the loss of penological purposes resulting from twenty-three years 
waiting on death row renders an execution cruel and unusual punishment. See id. at 1369 
(Fletcher, J., dissenting). 
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Mr. Jones’s claim, which challenged the inordinate delay not 
only in his case but statewide, is referred to as a systemic Lackey 
claim.14 Judge Carney’s decision to grant habeas relief on this 
ground vacated Mr. Jones’s death sentence. The district court 
decision, however, has no precedential effect; indeed, the Ninth 
Circuit has since reversed it.15 Nevertheless, this case is an ideal 
vehicle through which the Supreme Court can address the 
unconstitutional manner in which California applies its death penalty 
law.16 
This Comment contends that the timing is right for the Supreme 
Court to hear the bell toll. Part II presents a statement of the case, 
including a description of the crime and Mr. Jones’s original 
conviction and subsequent appeals. Part III discusses a small portion 
of the relevant historical framework, both constitutional law and 
California legislation. Part IV examines Judge Carney’s reasoning, 
and Part V addresses the criticisms of his reasoning. This Comment 
concludes that the time has come for the Supreme Court to do away 
with capital punishment. 
II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On April 7, 1995, a jury convicted Ernest Dewayne Jones of the 
first-degree murder and rape of his live-in girlfriend’s mother.17 But 
Mr. Jones’s courtroom issues started long before the jury deliberated. 
14. See, e.g., Newton, supra note 2, at 989. Commentators assert that a systemic Lackey
claim should carry more constitutional weight because it addresses the broader effects on the 
purposes of punishment. Id. at 988–89. 
15. Jones v. Davis, 806 F.3d 538 (2015). Although the court dismissed on the procedural
ground that Supreme Court precedent prevents federal courts from “recogniz[ing] constitutional 
rights that create new procedural rules,” its “reasoning was flawed on many levels.” Erwin 
Chemerinsky, Appeals Court Gets It Wrong on Death Penalty, ORANGE COUNTY REG. (Nov. 19, 
2015, 12:00 AM), http://www.ocregister.com/articles/court-692674-death-federal.html. Rather: 
[T]he Supreme Court repeatedly has said that changes in substantive constitutional
rights, as opposed to procedural ones, always can be the basis for habeas corpus relief.
That is exactly what Judge Carney found in holding the death penalty unconstitutional:
its application in California is so arbitrary that the state cannot apply it in a
constitutional manner.
Id. The Ninth Circuit also denied Mr. Jones’s petitions for rehearing and rehearing en banc. 
Order, Jones v. Davis, 806 F.3d 538 (2015) (No. 14-56373), ECF No. 97. 
16. See Chemerinsky, supra note 15 (“The decision of the 9th Circuit in Jones v. Davis is
just the most recent example of justice being denied on habeas corpus.”). 
17. See Jones v. Chappell, 31 F. Supp. 3d 1050, 1052–53 (C.D. Cal. 2014); People v. Jones,
64 P.3d 762 (Cal. 2003). 
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First, the trial court denied his pre-trial motion for a new attorney.18 
Then, it allowed the prosecutor to remove two prospective jurors on 
the basis that they “would be unable to faithfully and impartially 
apply the case before the jur[y].”19 The first juror indicated he could 
vote for the death penalty “in the right case,”20 but also gave 
conflicting statements suggesting that he was “against capital 
punishment.”21 The second juror suggested that he would require the 
prosecution to prove the defendant’s guilt to an absolute certainty 
before voting for a death sentence.22 Both jurors were excused, and 
the case proceeded to trial. 
A. The Crime
The crime took place on August 24, 1992—a day Mr. Jones 
spent buying and using marijuana and cocaine,23 purportedly for the 
first time in seven years.24 Mr. Jones was involved with a woman 
named Pamela Miller, and that evening he traveled a few blocks to 
her parents’ house to get some more money for some more drugs.25 
At this point, the prosecution and defense stories diverge, but the 
ending is the same: Pamela’s mother, Mrs. Miller, was tragically 
raped and murdered at the hands of Mr. Jones.26 
The defense did not contest that Mr. Jones raped and killed Mrs. 
Miller; Mr. Jones only challenged the circumstances and the requisite 
intent to commit the crimes.27 According to the defense, Mrs. Miller 
threatened and attacked Mr. Jones with a knife after he disclosed a 
domestic dispute with her daughter.28 Mr. Jones blacked out, heard 
voices, and “came to” after raping and fatally stabbing Mrs. Miller.29 
He fled the apartment in the Millers’ station wagon, ran from police, 
and attempted suicide before he was caught.30 
18. People v. Jones, 64 P.3d at 771–72.
19. Id. at 773.
20. Id.
21. Id. n.2.
22. Id. at 774.
23. Id. at 768.
24. Id. at 769.





30. Id. Mr. Jones shot himself in the chest with a rifle taken from the Millers’ house. Id. He
was unconscious and on a respirator for one week and spent two weeks recovering. Id. 
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B. The Penalty
The jury found Mr. Jones guilty of first-degree murder and rape 
under the special circumstance allegation that the murder was 
committed in the commission of the rape.31 During the penalty phase, 
the prosecution presented evidence that the defendant lacked remorse 
and that he did not hear voices for the year leading up to the 
murder.32 The prosecution also noted that he had committed two 
previous sexual assaults.33 
The defense painted a picture of the “living hell” in which the 
defendant grew up.34 Both of his parents were alcoholics, used 
marijuana in front of him and his siblings, and had physical 
altercations, including one occasion when his mother stabbed his 
father.35 His mother repeatedly cheated on his father, and she once 
told his father, in the defendant’s presence, that he was not the 
defendant’s father.36 After Mr. Jones’ father left the family, his 
mother constantly beat him and his siblings with “[w]hatever she had 
in her hands.”37 
At the time of the crime, Mr. Jones reportedly “‘slipped back 
into [his] childhood’ and had a vision of walking into a room where 
his mother was with a man ‘who wasn’t [his] father.’”38 Based on 
prior reports and interviews with Mr. Jones, a court-appointed 
psychiatrist diagnosed him with schizoaffective schizophrenia.39 
Despite the extensive mitigating evidence, the jury set the penalty at 
death. The trial court denied the defendant’s motion for a new trial 
and his motion for modification of the sentence.40 
On appeal, Mr. Jones challenged California’s death penalty 
statute on several grounds.41 One of the challenges was that an 
31. Id. at 767.
32. Id. at 771.
33. Id. at 769, 771.
34. Id. at 771.
35. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 770 (quoting another source).
39. Id. at 771. Notably, defense counsel failed to call the psychiatrist during the guilt phase
to testify as to the defendant’s ability to form the specific intent to commit rape. Defendant later 
alleged ineffective assistance of counsel on this ground. Id. at 777–78. 
40. Id. at 767.
41. Id. at 786. The challenges were that: (1) it does not require the jury to make specific
written findings as to aggravating factors; (2) it does not require that the jury return unanimous 
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inmate suffers cruel and unusual punishment due to the inherent 
delays in resolving his appeal.42 The court responded unflinchingly: 
“If the appeal results in reversal of the death judgment, he has 
suffered no conceivable prejudice, while if the judgment is affirmed, 
the delay has prolonged his life.”43 
Mr. Jones sat on death row for eight years before the California 
Supreme Court affirmed his conviction.44 The judgment became final 
on October 21, 2003, when the United States Supreme Court denied 
certiorari.45 Mr. Jones’s habeas counsel filed his state habeas petition 
in October 2002.46 In 2009, the California Supreme Court denied that 
petition in an unpublished order.47 
One year later, Mr. Jones’s habeas counsel filed his petition for 
federal habeas relief.48 In 2014, his counsel amended that petition to 
include allegations that the systemic and inordinate delay in 
California’s post-conviction review process creates an arbitrary 
system in which only a random handful of the hundreds sentenced to 
death will be executed.49 Under these circumstances, execution 
serves no penological purpose and violates the constitutional 
proscription against cruel and unusual punishment.50 
III. HISTORICAL FRAMEWORK
“The meaning of ‘cruel and unusual punishment’ under the 
Eighth Amendment must be interpreted in a ‘flexible and dynamic 
manner,’ and measured against the ‘evolving standards of decency 
that mark the progress of a maturing society.’”51 The provision 
developed from English common law “with the intention of placing 
written findings as to the aggravating factors; (3) it does not require that the jury be instructed on 
the presumption of life; and (4) it does not provide for intercase proportionality review. Id. 
42. Id. at 787.
43. Id.
44. Jones v. Chappell, 31 F. Supp. 3d 1050, 1060 (C.D. Cal. 2014); see People v. Jones, 64
P.3d 762, 762 (Cal. 2003).
45. Jones, 31 F. Supp. 3d at 1060; see Jones v. California, 540 U.S. 952 (2003).
46. Jones, 31 F. Supp. 3d at 1060.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.; see First Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, Jones v. Chappell, 31 F.
Supp. 3d 1050 (C.D. Cal. 2014) (No. CV 09-02158-CJC). 
50. See Jones, 31 F. Supp. 3d at 1061.
51. Fierro v. Gomez, 77 F.3d 301, 306 (9th Cir. 1996), vacated, 519 U.S. 918 (1996),
remanded sub nom. Fierro v. Terhune, 147 F.3d 1158 (9th Cir. 1998) (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 
428 U.S. 153, 171 (1976); Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958)). 
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limits on the government and the potential abuse of this power 
against persons convicted of crimes.”52 Specifically, it “was 
concerned primarily with selective or irregular application of harsh 
penalties.”53 Notably, members of the First Congress, while debating 
the Bill of Rights, “objected to the words ‘cruel and unusual 
punishments’” as “being too indefinite” and “hav[ing] no 
meaning.”54 That concern, expressed 226 years ago, proved 
prophetic, anticipating the labyrinth and resulting uncertainty that 
our death penalty jurisprudence has created. 
A. Constitutional Law
In 1972, the California Supreme Court determined that the death 
penalty violated the California Constitution’s prohibition against 
cruel or unusual punishment, in part due to the extreme delays 
between sentencing and execution.55 That same year, the United 
States Supreme Court heard Furman v. Georgia,56 a consolidation of 
three cases in which petitioners challenged their death sentences 
under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.57 In a 5-4 decision, 
the Court’s one-paragraph per curiam opinion held that capital 
punishment as applied in Texas and Georgia constituted cruel and 
unusual punishment.58 Although Furman involved individual claims 
challenging the death penalty as applied in Georgia and Texas, the 
resulting decision, comprising five separate opinions, abolished the 
entire system of capital punishment throughout the United States.59 
The opinion was sweeping, but its reasoning was not clear. The 
majority in Furman could not agree on a rationale and issued five 
52. Risdal v. Martin, 810 F. Supp. 1049, 1052–53 (S.D. Iowa 1993) (citing Browning-Ferris
Indus. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 266 (1989)). 
53. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 242 (1972) (Douglas, J., concurring).
54. Id. at 244 (citing 1 Annals of Cong. 754 (1789)).
55. See People v. Anderson, 493 P.2d 880, 894 (Cal. 1972) (en banc), superseded by
constitutional amendment, CAL. CONST. art. I, § 27. The full extent of the decision is beyond the 
scope of this Comment. See CAL. CONST. art. I, § 17 (“Cruel or unusual punishment may not be 
inflicted or excessive fines imposed.”). 
56. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
57. Id. at 239–40. The Fourteenth Amendment incorporates the Eighth Amendment and
applies it to the States. See Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962). 
58. Furman, 408 U.S. at 239 (per curiam).
59. See id.at 411 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (“Not only are the capital punishment laws of 39
States and the District of Columbia struck down, but also all those provisions of the federal 
statutory structure . . . .”); Brent E. Newton, The Slow Wheels of Furman’s Machinery of Death, 
13 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 41, 47 (2012). 
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separate opinions.60 Four of the opinions focused, at least in part, on 
the arbitrary selection of who receives a death sentence.61 Justice 
Stewart articulated the issue most vividly: “These death sentences 
are cruel and unusual in the same way that being struck by lightning 
is cruel and unusual. . . . [T]he petitioners are among a capriciously 
selected random handful upon whom the sentence of death has in 
fact been imposed.”62 
Beyond the mere arbitrariness rendering capital punishment 
cruel and unusual, Justice Brennan cited the California Supreme 
Court, recognizing the psychological toll on an inmate awaiting 
execution.63 Perhaps foreshadowing the future Lackey claim, he 
acknowledged this mental anguish and factored it into his equation 
for calculating the unstated definition of “cruel.”64 All of the 
opinions—even the dissents—made reference to the purposes of 
punishment, indicating that a punishment inflicted by the State must 
serve a purpose to pass constitutional muster. 
60. Furman, 408 U.S. at 414–15 (Powell, J., dissenting) (summarizing the distinct reasoning
of the five majority opinions). 
61. “Yet we know that the discretion of judges and juries in imposing the death penalty
enables the penalty to be selectively applied . . . .” Id. at 255 (Douglas, J., concurring). Justice 
Brennan expounded on the history of the Eighth Amendment, then cited “four principles by 
which we may determine whether a particular punishment is ‘cruel and unusual,’” id. at 281 
(Brennan, J., concurring), including “that the State must not arbitrarily inflict a severe 
punishment,” id. at 291. “I simply conclude that the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments cannot 
tolerate the infliction of a sentence of death under legal systems that permit this unique penalty to 
be so wantonly and freakishly imposed.” Id. at 310 (Stewart, J., concurring). And Justice White 
stated, “the death penalty is exacted with great infrequency even for the most atrocious crimes 
and that there is no meaningful basis for distinguishing the few cases in which it is imposed from 
the many cases in which it is not.” Id. at 313 (White, J., concurring). Justice Marshall did not 
specifically reference its arbitrary imposition, but “engage[d] in a long and tedious journey,” id. at 
370 (Marshall, J., concurring), to arrive at the conclusion that “the death penalty is an excessive 
and unnecessary punishment that violates the Eighth Amendment,” id. at 358–59. 
62. Id. at 309–10 (Stewart, J., concurring).
63. Id. at 288 (Brennan, J., concurring) (citing People v. Anderson, 493 P.2d 880, 894 (Cal.
1972) (en banc), superseded by constitutional amendment, CAL. CONST. art. I, § 27 (“As the 
California Supreme Court pointed out, ‘the process of carrying out a verdict of death is often so 
degrading and brutalizing to the human spirit as to constitute psychological torture.’”); see, e.g., 
Rachel E. Barkow, The Court of Life and Death: The Two Tracks of Constitutional Sentencing 
Law and the Case for Uniformity, 107 MICH. L. REV. 1145, 1168–69 (2009) (“But it is not just 
the physical pain associated with death that may make it different in kind from other 
punishments, for ‘mental pain is an inseparable part of our practice of punishing criminals by 
death.’” (quoting Furman, 408 U.S. at 288)). 
64. Furman, 408 U.S. at 288 (Brennan, J., concurring) (“In addition, we know that mental
pain is an inseparable part of our practice of punishing criminals by death, for the prospect of 
pending execution exacts a frightful toll during the inevitable long wait between the imposition of 
sentence and the actual infliction of death.”). 
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The death penalty moratorium was short-lived. Four years later, 
in 1976, the Supreme Court heard five death penalty cases, including 
the often-cited Gregg v. Georgia.65 The Court upheld statutory 
schemes in three of the cases, but rejected mandatory death-penalty 
statutes in Louisiana and North Carolina. The Court based its 
decisions on the premise that the Eighth Amendment does not 
prohibit capital punishment so long as “two principal social 
purposes” are served: retribution and deterrence.66 Since Furman 
emphasized the “death is different”67 premise, many post-Furman 
statutes require “meaningful appellate review”68 and mandate that a 
defendant take advantage of this process.69 
Ironically, the inordinate delay prevalent not just in California 
but throughout the country is attributed to the post-Furman statutory 
regimes that require States to painstakingly ensure that capital 
punishment is constitutionally administered.70 But it is a problem of 
relatively recent origin. As many scholars have noted, the 1976 cases 
upholding post-Furman death-penalty statutes were decided at “a 
time when delays in the administration of the death penalty 
obviously did not exist.”71 So perhaps it was not too surprising when 
the Court saw the “Lackey claim” raised for the first time nearly 
twenty years later.72 
Justice Stevens, often joined by Justice Breyer, has repeatedly 
expressed his opinion that execution after such lengthy delays is 
“unacceptably cruel.”73 He bases this belief on the “especially 
65. 428 U.S. 153, 207 (1976) (upholding post-Furman death-penalty statute); see also
Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 260 (1976) (same); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976) (same); 
Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325, 360 (1976) (invalidating mandatory death-penalty statute); 
Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976) (same). 
66. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 183.
67. See Furman, 408 U.S. at 287 (Brennan, J., concurring) (“Death is today an unusually
severe punishment, unusual in its pain, in its finality, and in its enormity.”). But see Atkins v. 
Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 337–44 (2002) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (explaining that “death is different” 
jurisprudence lacks historical support). 
68. Parker v. Dugger, 498 U.S. 308, 321 (1991).
69. See, e.g., Alex Kozinski & Sean Gallagher, Death: The Ultimate Run-on Sentence, 46
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1, 6 n.21 (1995) (citations omitted). 
70. See, e.g., Newton, supra note 59, at 45–49 (describing the system of rules that developed
after Furman). 
71. Newton, supra note 2, at 986. The delays “obviously did not exist” because the system
was still in its infancy stage four years after being dismantled by Furman. Id. 
72. Lackey v. Texas (Lackey II), 514 U.S. 1045 (1995).
73. See, e.g., Johnson v. Bredesen, 558 U.S. 1067 (2009) (Stevens, J.) (expressing his view
in a memorandum respecting the denial of certiorari and stay of execution for a petitioner who 
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severe, dehumanizing conditions of confinement” and the inability of 
a delayed execution to further the public purposes of retribution and 
deterrence.74 
Every punishment administered throughout this country’s 
criminal justice system purportedly depends on a stated purpose,75 
and it is no different, and arguably more critical, in the case of 
capital punishment.76 Supreme Court death-penalty jurisprudence 
repeatedly reflects on the role of deterrence and retribution in capital 
punishment, emphasizing that these are critical justifications for the 
existence of the death penalty.77 Of course, scholars have always 
debated the death sentence’s ability to serve these purposes, even in 
the absence of inordinate delays. But the states’ attempts to 
rationalize the ultimate punishment lose force when that punishment 
is infrequently administered and follows decades of delay when it is 
administered.78 
1. Defining and Finding Deterrent Effects79
The argument against any deterrence resulting from capital 
punishment begins with reason because a person contemplating a 
had been confined to a solitary cell awaiting his execution for nearly 29 years). Justice Stevens 
found Johnson’s case particularly compelling for four reasons: (1) the lack of physical evidence, 
(2) the petitioner maintaining his innocence, (3) the delays resulting from the state’s failure to
disclose certain evidence, and (4) the procedural vehicle—42 U.S.C. § 1983—used to raise the
Lackey claim. Id. at 1068.
74. Id. at 1069 (citations omitted).
75. See, e.g., Michele Cotton, Back with a Vengeance: The Resilience of Retribution as an
Articulated Purpose of Criminal Punishment, 37 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1313, 1315 (2000). 
76. “Within the capital punishment context [deterrence and retribution] hold special
importance.” Sara Colón, Capital Crime: How California’s Administration of the Death Penalty 
Violates the Eighth Amendment, 97 CAL. L. REV. 1377, 1381 (2009). 
77. See, e.g., Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407 (2008) (finding that a death sentence for
the rape of a child does not serve the purposes of punishment); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 
(2005) (deeming the death penalty of juveniles “disproportionate” under the Eighth Amendment); 
Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) (holding that the purposes of punishment are not served 
by executing the mentally retarded); Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982) (invalidating capital 
punishment for a non-triggerman coconspirator). 
78. “Proponents of this argument [that the death penalty can be justified by its deterrent
effect] necessarily admit that its validity depends upon the existence of a system in which the 
punishment of death is invariably and swiftly imposed.” Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 302 
(1972) (Brennan, J., concurring). 
79. Deterrence is the principal utilitarian justification for capital punishment. See, e.g., Paul
Robinson & John Darley, The Utility of Desert, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 453, 454–55 (1997) (noting 
that Bentham developed “the classic formulation of the deterrence rationale for punishment”). In 
this context, deterrence is general, meaning that an offender’s punishment deters others from 
committing the same crime. 
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capital crime must distinguish between death and life in prison.80 
Capital punishment’s purported deterrent effect can only be 
measured from a very small population: those criminals that would 
choose not to commit a crime that they would otherwise commit if 
their sole punishment was life in prison without the possibility of 
parole.81 Under the modern capital punishment regime, these 
potential criminals must also consider a “risk of death [that] is 
remote and improbable” as opposed to “the risk of long-term 
imprisonment [that] is near and great.” As Justice Brennan outlined 
in Furman: 
The concern, then, is with a particular type of potential 
criminal, the rational person who will commit a capital 
crime knowing that the punishment is long-term 
imprisonment, which may well be for the rest of his life, but 
will not commit the crime knowing that the punishment is 
death. On the face of it, the assumption that such persons 
exist is implausible.82 
Given the decades that regularly transpire between sentencing 
and death in our current system, the assumption that this hypothetical 
criminal and his ability to distinguish between two forms of 
punishment is not just implausible, it is preposterous. And so a 
critical issue emerges: How does one measure the deterrent effect 
solely from capital punishment when decades elapse between 
sentencing and execution? This issue becomes especially important 
when one considers the widely accepted premise that the 
effectiveness of a punishment depends on how soon the punishment 
follows the punishable behavior.83 
80. See, e.g., Furman, 408 U.S. at 301 (Brennan, J., concurring) (“Particularly is that true
when the potential criminal . . . must not only consider the risk of punishment, but also 
distinguish between two possible punishments . . . . [T]he rational person who will commit a 
capital crime knowing that the punishment is long-term imprisonment . . . but will not commit the 
crime knowing that the punishment is death.”). 
81. The analysis must only consider this theoretical population because “[i]f there is a
significantly less severe punishment adequate to achieve the purposes for which the punishment 
is inflicted, the punishment inflicted is unnecessary and therefore excessive.” Id. 
82. Id. at 301.
83. “All economists and criminologists accept that deterrence is a function not merely of the
severity of a sanction, but also of its certainty and speed.” Brief of Amici Curiae Empirical 
Scholars Concerning Deterrence and the Death Penalty in Support of Petitioner/Appellee, Jones 
v. Davis, 806 F.3d 538 (9th Cir. 2015) (No. 14-56373) [hereinafter Empirical Scholars’ Amicus
Brief].
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Delay in execution is not the only factor affecting a 
punishment’s deterrent effect. When the punishment is infrequently 
imposed, as with the death penalty, deterrence is diminished even 
more because “common sense and experience tell us that 
seldom-enforced laws become ineffective measures for controlling 
human conduct and that the death penalty, unless imposed with 
sufficient frequency, will make little contribution to deterring those 
crimes for which it may be exacted.”84 Measuring the deterrent effect 
of any punishment, even without the complications of extreme delays 
and arbitrariness, is an exercise in futility. In Gregg, the Supreme 
Court recognized the impossible task of determining a punishment’s 
deterrent effect with any degree of certainty: “Although some of the 
studies [we have reviewed] suggest that the death penalty may not 
function as a significantly greater deterrent than lesser penalties, 
there is no convincing empirical evidence either supporting or 
refuting this view.”85 In the absence of “convincing empirical 
evidence,” the Court deferred to the state.86 As noted by subsequent 
opinions, the Court left open the question of whether it would even 
be possible to develop “convincing empirical evidence” refuting the 
justification for the death penalty.87 In spite of the overwhelming 
support finding that the current system has no deterrent effect, the 
goal of “proving” this with “convincing empirical evidence” 
becomes seemingly impossible. 
2. Is Retribution Reasonable After Decades of Waiting?
Retribution, the principal moral—as opposed to utilitarian—
justification for capital punishment, stands for the premise: “you get 
what you deserve.” But retribution is more than mere blood 
vengeance; it is the “expression of society’s moral outrage at 
particularly offensive conduct.”88 As such, it provides a community 
with closure and seeks to ameliorate vigilante justice.89 But 
84. Furman, 408 U.S. at 312 (White, J., concurring).
85. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 185 (1976).
86. Id.
87. “The question that the Court deliberately left open in Gregg was what might constitute
‘more convincing evidence’ that a particular application of the death penalty is, in fact, ‘without 
[penological] justification.’” Ceja v. Stewart, 134 F.3d 1368, 1375 (9th Cir. 1998) (citations 
omitted). 
88. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 183.
89. “When people begin to believe that organized society is unwilling or unable to impose
upon criminal offenders the punishment they ‘deserve,’ then there are sown the seeds of 
2016] DEATH KNELL FOR THE DEATH PENALTY 283 
retribution is falling out of favor as a legitimate justification to 
capital punishment—why?90 And the plausibility of providing 
closure to a community thirty years after sentencing is remote at best 
given the fluidity of communities. So, is the prospect of retribution 
even reasonable given the inordinate delays? 
B. California’s Legislative History
Nine months after the California Supreme Court ruled capital 
punishment violated the state Constitution in 1972,91 the California 
electorate amended the state Constitution and superseded the 
decision.92 Five years later, in 1977, the California legislature 
enacted a statute that followed the constitutional guidelines outlined 
in Gregg. In 1978, California voters passed Proposition 7, 
superseding the 1977 statute. Proposition 7 is the death penalty 
statute currently in force. 
In 2012, a ballot initiative to replace the death penalty with life 
without parole was narrowly defeated by a vote of 52-48 percent.93 
Despite evidence that death penalty support is at an all-time low 
since voters approved Proposition 7, opponents of capital 
punishment have not solidified plans for another ballot initiative.94 
Under the California Constitution, “legislative amendment or repeal 
by statute, initiative, or referendum” is necessary to remove the death 
penalty as a sentencing option.95 Judge Carney, however, was not 
willing to wait for the voters to change the fate of Ernest Dewayne 
Jones. 
anarchy—of self-help, vigilante justice, and lynch law.” Furman, 408 U.S. at 308 (Stewart, J., 
concurring). 
90. “Retaliation, vengeance, and retribution have been roundly condemned as intolerable
aspirations for a government in a free society.” Id. at 343 (Marshall, J., concurring). 
91. See People v. Anderson, 493 P.2d 880, 880 (Cal. 1972) (en banc), superseded by
constitutional amendment, CAL. CONST. art. I, § 27. 
92. History of Capital Punishment in California, CAL. DEP’T OF CORR. & REHAB., http://
www.cdcr.ca.gov/Capital_Punisment/history_of_capital_punishment.html (last visited Aug. 22, 
2015). 
93. Howard Mintz, Death Penalty Support Slipping in California, Poll Says, SAN JOSE
MERCURY NEWS (Sept. 12, 2014), http://mercurynews.com/California/ci_26519875/field-poll 
-support-death-penalty-california-slipping.
94. Id.
95. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 27.
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IV. JUDGE CARNEY’S REASONING
Judge Carney began his analysis with the unequivocal assertion 
that “no rational person can question that the execution of an 
individual carries with it the solemn obligation of the government to 
ensure that the punishment is not arbitrarily imposed and that it 
furthers the interests of society.”96 Then he reminded the reader of 
the finality of death.97 Mortality—a reality ignored by most people as 
they live their everyday lives—needs the help of numbers to fathom 
its severity; “the punishment of death ‘differs more from life 
imprisonment than a one-hundred-year prison term differs from one 
of only a year or two.’”98 By quantifying the unimaginable, Judge 
Carney set the tone for his analysis. 
He focused his reasoning on Furman99 to reinforce his 
conclusion that the arbitrary imposition of the death penalty is 
“abhorrent to the Constitution.”100 He relied on Furman and its 
progeny to reestablish the premise that when the execution of death 
row inmates is randomly imposed, the sentence cannot possibly serve 
the penological purposes of deterrence and retribution.101 He moved 
on to quickly dispose of the state’s arguments, and then concluded 
that in the absence of social objectives justifying the state-sanctioned 
murder of inmates, a death sentence equates to cruel and unusual 
punishment forbidden by the Constitution.102 
96. Jones v. Chappell, 31 F. Supp. 3d 1050, 1061 (C.D. Cal. 2014).
97. Id. “As the American tradition of law has long recognized, death is a punishment
different in kind from any other.” Id. 
98. Id. at 1061 (citing Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976)).
99. See infra Section V.A.
100. Jones, 31. F. Supp. 3d at 1061.
101. Id. “[I]n Gregg v. Georgia, when the Supreme Court lifted what had become Furman’s
de facto moratorium on the death penalty, it did so with the understanding that such punishment 
should serve these ‘two principal social purposes.’” Id. at 1062 (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 
U.S. 153, 183 (1976)). He continued, “[s]ince that time, the Supreme Court has harkened back to 
these twin purposes to guide its evaluation of challenges to the death penalty under the Eighth 
Amendment.” Id. (citing Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 441 (2008)); see also Newton, 
supra note 2, at 999 (collecting cases analyzing the purposes of capital punishment). 
102. Jones, 31 F. Supp. 3d at 1061; see also Colón, supra note 76, at 1384–85 (contending
that “California’s capital punishment system is unconstitutional both because its delays and low 
execution rate mean that it in many ways is not retributive or deterrent at all, and because it is 
never more retributive or deterrent than life without parole.”). 
2016] DEATH KNELL FOR THE DEATH PENALTY 285 
A. Questioning California’s “Death Lottery”
Judge Carney first attacked the arbitrariness of California’s 
death penalty system with some alarming statistics. In the 
thirty-seven years since the California legislature reinstated the death 
penalty, thirteen of the more than 900 individuals sentenced to death 
have been executed.103 That equates to an execution rate of 1.4 
percent. Of the remainder, ninety-four have died of other causes, 
thirty-nine were granted relief and have not been resentenced, and 
748 are currently on death row, 40 percent of whom have been there 
longer than nineteen years.104 The average wait for an inmate to go 
through the mandatory review process to execution is twenty-five 
years.105 Further, due to the ever-increasing number of inmates 
sentenced to death and the veritable halt in executions due to federal 
and state court decisions invalidating the capital punishment for 
different reasons, this number is likely to increase.106 Even if 
California never again sentenced another convict to death, “the State 
would have to conduct more than one execution a week for the next 
fourteen years” just to carry out the sentences already imposed.107 
The proposition of carrying out this vast number of executions 
in a timely manner is unrealistic. This is especially true considering 
“only 17 inmates currently on Death Row have even completed the 
post-conviction review process and are awaiting their execution.”108 
With this recognition, Judge Carney rang the bell: “[f]or all practical 
purposes then, a sentence of death in California is a sentence of life 
imprisonment with the remote possibility of death—a sentence no 
rational legislature or jury could ever impose.”109 
103. Jones, 31 F. Supp. 3d at 1062.
104. Id. at 1053–54.
105. Id. at 1054. “Typically, the lapse of time between sentence and execution is twenty-five
years, twice the national average, and is growing wider each year.” Id. (citing Gerald Uelmen, 
Death Penalty Appeals and Habeas Proceedings: The California Experience, 93 MARQ. L. REV. 
495, 496 (2009)). 
106. Id. at 1062. “[N]o inmate has been executed since 2006, and there is no evidence to
suggest that executions will resume in the reasonably near future.” Id. Executions halted in 2006 
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Judge Carney then made the assumption that executions will one 
day resume in California, and a random selection of inmates will be 
put to death:110 
Yet their selection for execution will not depend on whether 
their crime was one of passion or of premeditation, on 
whether they killed one person or ten, or on any other proxy 
for the relative penological value that will be achieved by 
executing that inmate over any other. Nor will it either 
depend on the perhaps neutral criterion of executing 
inmates in the order in which they arrived on Death Row.111 
Rather, whether an inmate will walk down death row depends solely 
on “how quickly the inmate proceeds through the State’s 
dysfunctional post-conviction review process.”112 
And for Mr. Jones, this post-conviction process is on its way to 
progressing more quickly than average. Judge Carney projected it 
would likely equate to about twenty-three years after Mr. Jones 
received his initial sentence.113 At the time of Judge Carney’s order, 
285 out of the 380 inmates on Death Row had been there longer than 
Mr. Jones.114 Given the delays, “most of them will never face 
execution as a realistic possibility, unlike Mr. Jones.”115 In Judge 
Carney’s view, a system “where so many are sentenced to death but 
only a random few are actually executed” violates “the most 
fundamental of constitutional protections—that the government shall 
not be permitted to arbitrarily inflict the ultimate punishment of 
death.”116 
B. Negating the Purposes of Punishment
After establishing the infrequency of actual executions, Judge 
Carney emphasized the veritable depletion of deterrent and 
retributive justifications that results from the extraordinary delay 




113. Id. at 1063. Compare to the average of twenty-five years. Id. at 1054; see Uelmen, supra
note 105. 
114. Jones, 31 F. Supp. 3d at 1063.
115. Id.
116. Id.
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rationales are the substance that renders a punishment just, and their 
absence challenges the very notion of a civilized society.117 
Judge Carney cited “the law[] and common sense itself” to 
support the claim that “the deterrent effect of any punishment is 
contingent upon the certainty and timeliness of its imposition.”118 He 
emphasized that this condition is no different in the context of the 
death penalty.119 Independent of the penalty’s arbitrary imposition, 
Judge Carney reasoned the extraordinary delay “seriously 
undermines the continued deterrent effect of the State’s death 
penalty.”120 He followed this assertion with a reminder that “delay is 
not the only problem,” and reemphasized the miniscule possibility 
that someone sentenced to death will actually be executed.121 He 
summarized: “Under such a system, the death penalty is about as 
effective a deterrent to capital crime as the possibility of a lightning 
strike is to going outside in the rain.”122 
The Order continued with a discussion concerning the ways in 
which “inordinate delay and unpredictability of executions . . . defeat 
the death penalty’s retributive objective.”123 Judge Carney countered 
the Supreme Court’s recognition of retribution as a “constitutionally 
permissible aim” with the contention that “inordinate delay frustrates 
that aim.”124 He then, once again, cited Furman to support his 
theory.125 
C. Addressing the State’s Arguments
Buried in the middle of Judge Carney’s analysis is the 
recognition that “courts have thus far generally not accepted the 
theory that extraordinary delay between sentencing and execution 
violates the Eighth Amendment.”126 Rather, courts rationalize the 
delay by first attributing it to a “constitutional safeguard”—i.e., the 
state’s attempt to ensure the accuracy of the conviction, and next, 
117. Id. (“Such an outcome is antithetical to any civilized notion of just punishment.”).




122. Id. Notably, “[t]here have been fewer executions in California than deaths by lightning
strike.” Colón, supra note 76, at 1377. 
123. Jones, 31 F. Supp. 3d at 1064.
124. Id. at 1064–65 (citing Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 183 (1976)).
125. Id. at 1065.
126. Id.
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assigning its cause to the petitioner.127 But in the case of California’s 
death penalty system, “such assumptions are simply incorrect.”128 
In California, the evidence indicates that much of the delay is 
caused by the state itself. Extreme delay is not an isolated problem, 
and in the majority of cases, it is not due to an individual petitioner’s 
frivolous filings. The systemic and inordinate delay, averaging 
twenty-five years, results from the post-conviction review process. 
Judge Carney cited a report by the California Commission on the 
Fair Administration of Justice,129 which proposed reforms estimated 
to reduce the time between sentencing and execution to between 
eleven and fourteen years—on par with the national average. He 
quickly followed the Commission’s recommended changes with a 
warning that the “process should not be curtailed in favor of speed 
over accuracy.”130 
Under federal statute, a petitioner must exhaust his available 
state remedies prior to a federal court granting relief.131 Mr. Jones 
did not complete this state review process before Judge Carney 
decided to hear the case, and so the state argued that Mr. Jones’s 
claim was procedurally barred. Judge Carney rebutted this contention 
by pointing out that requiring the petitioner to return to the California 
Supreme Court would force him to return to the system that “he has 
established is dysfunctional and incapable of protecting his 
constitutional rights.”132 
Judge Carney concluded his analysis with a recitation of the 
state’s broken promise. A promise made to the citizens of the state, 
the jurors who impose the penalty, the victims and their loved ones, 
and the hundreds of death row inmates. These death row inmates 
suffer through inordinate delays before their time runs up. But there 
127. Id. (citing Thompson v. McNeil, 556 U.S. 1114 (2009); People v. Anderson, 25 Cal.4th
543, 606 (2001)). 
128. Id. at 1066.
129. The California State Legislature established the Commission in 2004. The Commission
issued its final report in 2008. Id. at 1055. The report is available at http://www.ccfaj.org/ 
documents/CCFAJFinalReport.pdf. 
130. Id. at 1067. Judge Carney reminds the reader that federal habeas relief has been granted
in over half of the cases that have reached this stage. Id. 
131. See Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)
(2012). AEDPA has proved a monumental hurdle for death row inmates seeking habeas corpus 
review. Rightly so, as Congress’s stated purpose for enacting AEDPA was to decrease abuse of 
the habeas corpus process. 
132. Jones, 31 F. Supp. 3d at 1068.
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is no way for them to know when or if they will face execution. 
Judge Carney declared that such a system lacks a penological 
purpose, and is therefore, unconstitutional. 
V. ANALYSIS
Judge Carney’s Order may ring true for abolitionists and 
discordant for supporters of the death penalty, but is Attorney 
General Harris correct in her assertion that his reasoning is “not 
supported by the law?”133 
A. This Is Not Furman
The opinion returns to Furman like a song leans on its chorus 
for support. So any analysis must begin with the recognition that the 
“arbitrariness” that Judge Carney referenced is qualitatively different 
from the arbitrary sentencing recognized by the Furman Court.134 He 
acknowledged that the Furman Court faced “state sentencing 
schemes by which judges and juries were afforded virtually 
untrammeled discretion to decide whether to impose the ultimate 
sanction.”135 The petitioners in Furman challenged the death penalty 
“as applied” because evidence tended to establish that minorities 
were disproportionately sentenced to death.136 This disparity may 
persist to this day, but without the blatant discrimination that 
previously permeated the system, it is difficult, if not impossible, to 
prove.137 
But the disproportionate condemnation of minorities—
quantifiable or not—was not ultimately relevant to Judge Carney’s 
133. Dolan, supra note 6.
134. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 242 (1972) (Douglas, J., concurring) (“It would seem
to be incontestable that the death penalty inflicted on one defendant is ‘unusual’ if it discriminates 
against him by reason of his race, religion, wealth, social position, or class, or if it is imposed 
under a procedure that gives room for the play of such prejudices.”). 
135. Jones, 31 F. Supp. 3d at 1061.
136. Furman, 408 U.S. at 257 (Douglas, J., concurring) (“[These discretionary statutes] are
pregnant with discrimination.”); id. at 364 (Marshall, J., concurring) (“Indeed, a look at the bare 
statistics regarding executions is enough to betray much of the discrimination.”). Justice Stewart 
noted, however, that “racial discrimination has not been proved.” Id. at 310 (Stewart, J., 
concurring). 
137. See McClesky v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987) (rejecting defendant’s constitutional
challenge to the death penalty, which was based on statistical evidence of racial discrimination in 
sentencing); see generally LINDA E. CARTER ET AL., UNDERSTANDING CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 
§ 20 (3d ed. 2012) (discussing various race issues that factor into the death penalty discussion,
including: prosecutorial discretion, the race of the victim, jury selection, and unconscious bias).
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decision. It was the “arbitrary” execution of those already sentenced 
to death that warranted the application of the same principles on 
which Furman turned: “The Eighth Amendment simply cannot be 
read to proscribe a state from randomly selecting which few 
members of its criminal population it will sentence to death, but to 
allow that same state to randomly select which trivial few of those 
condemned it will actually execute.”138 He concluded: “Arbitrariness 
in execution is still arbitrary, regardless of when in the process the 
arbitrariness arises.”139 
Judge Carney’s point is well taken, and the fractured Furman 
concurrences support his contention.140 The opinions don’t 
distinguish between arbitrariness in sentencing and arbitrariness in 
execution because the absence of inordinate delays negated the 
possibility that the condemned would be arbitrarily selected to face 
death. But there is a fundamental difference between the intent to 
sentence an arbitrary few to death, and the constitutionally mandated, 
unintentionally-random churn through the “machinery of death.”141 It 
is much easier to conclude that the latter is simply an unfortunate but 
necessary consequence of the legal system established to protect the 
inmate.142 It is easier, but it is not right. The focus of the analysis 
must be on the purposes of punishment. When these purposes are lost 
in the cloud of arbitrariness, a punishment can no longer pass 
constitutional muster. 
Justice Thomas, in response to Justice Brennan, has repeatedly 
argued against the conclusion that inordinate delays violate the 
Eighth Amendment.143 And Justice Thomas is not alone. It may be 
difficult for the average American to conclude that forcing our vilest 
138. Jones, 31 F. Supp. 3d at 1063.
139. Id.
140. See Furman, 408 U.S. at 397 (Burger, J., dissenting) (“The critical factor in the
concurring opinions . . . is the infrequency with which the penalty is imposed.”). 
141. Callins v. Collins, 510 U.S. 1141, 1145 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting); see Newton,
supra note 59, at 45. 
142. In fact, the Ninth Circuit has relied on this reasoning to deny a stay of execution. See,
e.g., McKenzie v. Day, 57 F.3d 1461 (9th Cir.), opinion adopted on reh’g en banc, 57 F.3d 1493
(9th Cir. 1995) (suggesting that delays caused by satisfying the Eighth Amendment cannot
themselves violate it).
143. See, e.g., Knight v. Florida, 528 U.S. 990 (1999) (Thomas, J., concurring) (“I am
unaware of any support in the American constitutional tradition or in this Court’s precedent for 
the proposition that a defendant can avail himself of the panoply of appellate and collateral 
procedures and then complain when his execution is delayed.”). But note that under many 
statutory schemes, an inmate’s post-conviction appeal process is obligatory. 
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criminals144 to wait for death somehow violates the Constitution. 
Assuming they committed the crimes of which they are accused145 
and they received a fair trial,146 critics could easily argue that waiting 
for death is better than being dead, so these inmates have no grounds 
for complaint. But these critics must change their perspective. Death 
row inmates are not merely waiting for death; they are waiting to be 
heard. One need only consider that 60 percent of those inmates that 
have made it through the post-conviction relief process have had 
their sentences vacated.147 That powerful statistic should be 
sufficient to give Justice Thomas and his adherents pause. 
Neither of the elements—inordinate delay and arbitrary 
selection—can be viewed in isolation. The extremely long wait 
diminishes the legitimizing purposes to nearly nothing. The random 
selection constitutes cruel and unusual punishment under Furman 
and cannot be justified. Further, as noted above, the “life in prison, 
with the remote possibility of death”148 is excessive because it is 
qualitatively more severe than life without parole,149 and yet in 
application the distinction is blurred by the lengthy waits and high 
likelihood that execution will never take place. And so we turn back 
to Furman, and the relationship between the arbitrariness and the 
deterioration of penological purposes. For no matter the cause of the 
arbitrariness, the result is the same.150 
144. At various times throughout our jurisprudence, those sentenced to death have included: a
non-triggerman with no intent to kill (Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982)); the mentally 
retarded (Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002)); juvenile offenders (Roper v. Simmons, 543 
U.S. 551 (2005)); and child rapists (Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407 (2008)); see Newton, 
supra note 2, at 997. 
145. According to the Death Penalty Information Center, 155 death row inmates have been
exonerated since 1973. Innocence: List of Those Freed from Death Row, DEATH PENALTY INFO. 
CTR., http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/innocence-list-those-freed-death-row (last visited Aug. 20, 
2015). To be included on the Innocence List, a defendant must have been convicted, sentenced to 
death, and subsequently have either (1) been acquitted of all charges related to the particular 
crime, (2) had all charges dismissed by the prosecution, or (3) been granted a pardon based on 
evidence of innocence. Id. 
146. This assumption is even more tenuous than the last. See Jones v. Chappell, 31 F. Supp.
3d 1050, 1055 (C.D. Cal. 2014). 
147. Id.
148. Id. at 1053.
149. The waiting is psychologically more severe in two respects. First, an inmate must wait
more than ten years for a sentence to become final. And second, an inmate must live with the 
cloud of impending death. Additionally, the waiting is physically more severe due to the 
conditions of confinement. 
150. “Certainly concern for arbitrariness would extend to execution, which is the actual
implementation of the death sentence. In fact, perhaps subconsciously, some federal courts, 
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B. The Place for Purpose
If one accepts that capital punishment’s penological purposes 
exist at all, then both the deterioration of those purposes over the 
decades inmates sit on death row and the increased chance that many 
of those inmates will never be executed are, hypothetically, trivial 
concerns so long as the threat of execution looms overhead.151 And 
yet it is this very possibility that produces the mental anguish to 
which Justice Brennan so presciently referred. Although the Supreme 
Court relies on a purported purpose to constitutionalize a State’s 
punishment, the equation should not be so definitive. A punishment 
may serve a purpose, however slight, and still be characterized as 
cruel and unusual.152 The distinguishing factor is whether a 
punishment serves a purpose more effectively than a less severe form 
of punishment.153 In the absence of this element, a punishment is 
excessive, and an excessive punishment is necessarily cruel. 
This postulate is especially important when considering the 
“death is different” premise. Many opponents of Carney’s reasoning, 
and supporters of the death penalty, rationalize that a “life with the 
remote chance of death” sentence is equivalent to a life sentence 
without the possibility of parole. But, as Judge Carney pointed out, 
these sentences are as different as a one year versus one hundred year 
sentence.154 Although all living beings will pass, and humans possess 
the requisite consciousness to live with this realization every day, 
most of us do not face our days with the impending threat of 
execution hanging over our heads like an omnipresent storm cloud 
waiting to strike us with lightning.155 The international community 
has accepted the contention that this double sentence—an unknown 
including the Supreme Court, since Furman have referred to arbitrary execution as opposed to 
arbitrary sentencing—though without reference to the ratio.” Colón, supra note 76, at 1403. 
151. The purported deterrent effect of capital punishment is one of the most debated aspects
of the death penalty. The studies attempting to prove, or disprove, deterrence have been, and 
continue to be, inconclusive. See, e.g., Empirical Scholars Amicus Brief, supra note 83, at 16. 
152. It may also serve no purpose yet still pass constitutional muster. In his Furman dissent,
Justice Blackmun noted, “capital punishment serves no useful purpose that can be demonstrated.” 
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 405 (1972) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
153. Id. at 303 (Brennan, J., concurring) (“The question, however, is not whether death serves
these supposed purposes of punishment, but whether death serves them more effectively than 
imprisonment.”). 
154. Jones v. Chappell, 31 F. Supp. 3d 1050, 1061 (C.D. Cal. 2014).
155. “You can’t condemn a person to death and not have them anticipate their death, imagine
their death, and vicariously experience their death many, many times before they die.” Colón, 
supra note 76, at 1395. 
2016] DEATH KNELL FOR THE DEATH PENALTY 293 
term of years in solitary confinement on death row, followed by 
execution—is akin to torture.156 It is time for the Supreme Court to 
come to this realization as well. 
To understand just how “death is different,” it is important to 
return to the statistics and consider what constitutes a final sentence. 
The majority of death row inmates currently awaiting execution have 
not even completed their direct appeal process. These defendants are 
forced to wait an average of three to five years just to be appointed 
counsel to represent them.157 Add to that four years for the briefing 
process and two to three years to get on the California Supreme 
Court’s calendar, and “between 11.7 and 13.7 years will have 
elapsed” before a court has even heard a defendant’s direct appeal.158 
The years a defendant spends waiting to appeal his sentence are 
equivalent to years spent in purgatory—a no man’s land in between 
life and death. And this is how death is different. It is not the 
inevitability, for we all face that reality. And it is not attributable to 
an inmate’s death at the hands of the government. Rather, in the 
context of a system that will likely fail to execute its death row 
inmates, the vital distinguishing factor is that a death sentence sends 
a defendant down a different path, one where his voice is 
immediately muted for almost twelve years. 
Some scholars suggest that this punishment, somewhere in 
between life and death, is the result of a deliberate effort in 
California to have the penalty serve no more than a symbolic 
purpose: a system that threatens to inflict the penalty, whether or not 
it would be imposed.159 This “symbolic use of the death penalty” is a 
political compromise between anti and pro-death penalty 
advocates.160 One can only hope that California’s dysfunctional 
system is not the result of a deliberate effort. The state cannot afford 
to play political games with people’s lives, when the cost could mean 
156. See, e.g., Soering v. United Kingdom, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1989), http://hudoc.
echr.coe.int/fre?i=001-57619. 
157. Jones, 31 F. Supp. 3d at 1056. Once sentenced to death, California law mandates an
appeal to the California Supreme Court. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1239 (West 2004). 
158. Jones, 31 F. Supp. 3d at 1057.
159. Colón, supra note 76, at 1402.
160. Id. at 1401 (citing William S. Lofquist, Putting Them There, Keeping Them There, and
Killing Them: An Analysis of State-Level Variations in Death Penalty Intensity, 87 IOWA L. REV. 
1505, 1520 (2002)). 
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the opportunity for the wrongfully convicted to be heard. So maybe 
Judge Carney forced the Legislature’s hand. 
C. Judicial Activism: Removing the Role of the
California Voters 
In November 2012, California voters rejected a referendum to 
repeal the death penalty. In California, the legislature cannot amend 
or repeal voter-initiated legislation without voter approval.161 
Further, the most recent poll suggests that California voters still 
support the death penalty,162 despite its clutch-hold on the pockets of 
California voters.163 In addition, six bills designed to improve the 
death penalty system have failed to make it through the California 
legislature since the Commission issued its report in 2008.164 In that 
report, the Commission concluded that it would cost the State an 
additional $95 million a year to properly administer the death 
161. CAL. CONST. art. II, § 10.
162. See Mark DiCamillo & Mervin Field, Voter Support for the Death Penalty Declines in
California, THE FIELD POLL (Sept. 12, 2014), http://field.com/fieldpollonline/subscribers/Rls 
2486.pdf (reporting 56 percent of voters in favor of keeping the death penalty and 34 percent 
opposed). 
163. California spends $184 million annually administering the death penalty, for a total of $4
billion spent on capital punishment since 1978. See Arthur L. Alarcon & Paula M. Mitchell, 
supra note 4, at S41. 
164. Those six bills are:
(1) Senate Bill 1471 (2008), which attempted to streamline the post-conviction process
by: (a) setting a one-year deadline for the filing of habeas petitions; (b) loosening
the standards to allow more attorneys to qualify as defense counsel for capital
defendants; and (c) allowing habeas petitions to be heard in trial court, S.B. 1471,
2007–2008 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2008);
(2) Senate Bill 1025 (2010), which sought to require the Supreme Court to develop
procedures for initiating habeas corpus proceedings in trial courts, S.B. 1025,
2009–2010 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2010);
(3) Senate Constitutional Amendment 27 (2010), which would have allowed the
California Supreme Court to transfer appellate review of death penalty cases to a
court of appeals, with subsequent Supreme Court review, S. Const. Am. 27, 2009–
2010 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2010);
(4) Senate Bill 490 (2011), which called for a referendum abolishing the death penalty,
S.B. 490, 2011–2012 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2011);
(5) Senate Bill 1514 (2012), which proposed to remove the mandatory appeal
following a death sentence and to allow a court of appeals to hear capital cases in
place of the California Supreme Court, S.B. 1514, 2011–2012 Leg., Reg. Sess.
(Cal. 2012); and
(6) Senate Bill 779 (2013), which would have required a petitioner to file a habeas
corpus in the court that imposed the sentence, reduced the standards for capital
appellate and habeas counsel, sped up the appeals process, and allowed the use of
the gas chamber for executions, S.B. 779, 2013–2014 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2013).
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penalty. The legislature is reluctant to reallocate funding in an 
already scant budget, and is unwilling to support a tax increase, 
simply for the purpose of addressing California’s capital punishment 
system. And so it appears the deadlocked system is stuck spinning its 
wheels, burning fuel at a cost of $184 million dollars a year, and yet 
going nowhere. 
VI. THE FUTURE OF THE DEATH PENALTY IN CALIFORNIA
AND IN THE UNITED STATES 
Given the state of affairs, Judge Carney’s Order sounds all the 
more desirable. Considering that it is built on Furman’s foundation, 
however amorphous, it should stand. The Ninth Circuit should affirm 
the district court decision, and the Supreme Court should hear the 
case.165 It is time for the Court to outline the contours of cruel and 
unusual punishment, not just for the death row inmates, but also for 
the sake of civility in our society. 
The statistics are staggering. And this Comment has not even 
focused on the most baffling figure—the $4 billion price tag 
associated with California’s current death penalty system. Members 
of the Supreme Court have repeatedly acknowledged that the length 
of time an inmate must wait on death row factors into the Eighth 
Amendment analysis. In prior decisions, the wait wasn’t quite long 
enough for the Court to qualify the punishment as cruel and unusual. 
But now, California’s twenty-five year average is twice the national 
average, and one and a half times the wait argued under the original 
Lackey claim. But those individual voices recognizing the potential 
legitimacy of a Lackey claim do not comprise clearly established 
Supreme Court precedent, which is required for an analysis to 
survive. For this reason, the Carney Order and subsequent amicus 
briefs to the Ninth Circuit shift the focus away from Lackey and 
squarely on Furman. 
A punishment can only be justified if it serves a purpose, and it 
can only serve a purpose if it contributes something more than a less 
165. As another court noted, although the “[d]efendant may be correct that the current federal
death penalty is so ‘hopelessly and irremediably arbitrary, capricious and inconsistent’ that it is 
unconstitutional, such a finding is not ours to make. Only the Supreme Court can overrule its 
conclusion in Gregg to find that the FDPA, even though it satisfies Gregg, it is unconstitutional.” 
United States v. Barnes, 532 F. Supp. 2d 625, 632 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (citing Gregg v. Georgia, 428 
U.S. 153 (1976)). 
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severe punishment. The evidence indicates that the death penalty, as 
administered, has no greater deterrent effect than a life sentence and 
serves no retribution twenty-five years after the crime. If anything, 
its brutalizing effect may increase crime by validating the idea that 
killing is acceptable under certain circumstances. Further, the 
unfulfilled promise to the victims’ families shatters the community’s 
faith in the system, ultimately leading to an increase in vigilante 
justice. 
Currently, eighteen states and the District of Columbia have 
abolished the death penalty completely.166 An additional eight states 
are under a moratorium.167 Of these, half are official moratoriums 
declared by state governors, and the other half are de facto 
moratoriums due to judicial decree.168 Another twelve state statuses 
are unclear due to specific challenges to lethal injection protocol.169 
According to the Death Penalty Information Center, this year, 
representatives in eleven state legislatures have introduced or plan to 
introduce bills to abolish the death penalty.170 It is evident that the 
country is slowly but steadily progressing towards abolishing the 
death penalty. Unfortunately, California needs the help of the Court. 
When confronted with the facts, the truth is evident: the time has 
come for the death penalty to die. 
166. States with and Without the Death Penalty, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., http://
www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/states-and-without-death-penalty (last visited Aug. 22, 2015). 
167. Death Penalty in Flux, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/
death-penalty-flux (last visited Feb. 20, 2015). 
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Recent Legislative Activity, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.
org/recent-legislative-activity (last visited Feb. 20, 2015). 
